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22 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, South Vietnem Branch

ATTENTION : Sem Adams

SUBJECT : Prospects for the VCI

I. The VCI Structure

This section should be a brief description of the structure of the VCI at the national level and throughout the countryside. It should define "VCI" and describe what it does, how it operates, the dhain of command. Indicate where it is strong and where it is weak throughout the country. How it operates in VC controlled and contested and GVN (including urban) areas.

Give to the extent possible estimates of its size differentiating between gross numbers and the hard-core components that are of real significance. Can some gross measure be made of the size of the infrastructure by Corps area. This section should not be more than 5 pages in length.

II. The next section will discuss the future of the VCI (one year hence) under different assumptions.

Case A. Assume that there is a cease-fire. US troops continue to withdraw.

Variant 1. There is little terrorism, pacification makes little progress but doesn't collapse, the GVN keeps its head above water in terms of its major problem, political and military. With a cease-fire, what advantages would the VC have that it doesn't have now. How would the VCI change in terms of size, organization, exposure?

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Variant 2. Assume that the GVN position worsens, economic and political problems greatly increase but there is no total collapse of the GVN.

Case 2. Assume that there is no cease-fire but that the enemy maintains a continued low profile. Assume that US troops continue to withdraw. What are the prospects now for the VCI compared to Case 1.

We may make some additional changes in the assumptions of II on Monday. For the time being follow this outline. The report is to be sent to Dr. Kissenger by the DCI and must be out of the building by June 28.

In summary, Dr. Kissenger asked that the report answer these questions. How does the VCI maintain a viable force when he is told that thousands are being killed? What is the capability of the VCI? Can losses be replaced? What will the threat look like in the future?

Chief Indochina Division

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